IRAN COMBINES SUPPRESSION FORCES REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS NOW ALSO BASSIJIS

Iran: Sepah prepares for a ‘hot war’ (Alan note: hot war with internal dissidents) In the second of a two-part series on the chances of US-Iran military conflict, ISN Security Watch looks at the preparations under way by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards or Sepah is a stepchild of the revolution. Created in 1979 to defend the nascent revolutionary government from its myriad enemies, it has been a dedicated and loyal defender of the Islamic order. Whether it was in street fighting in the revolutionary days, the bloody trenches of the Iran-Iraq War or in repulsing reformist encroachments, it was always Sepah at the frontlines of the struggle. It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the Islamic Republic has been and remains closely woven to that of Sepah. Today, in yet another historic juncture, the Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran is again being called upon to safeguard the revolution from threats no less dangerous and deadly to its existence: Iran’s arch-enemies, the US and Israel, are intent on destroying its hard-won nuclear infrastructures and, quite possibly, decapitating its political and military leadership. Judging from the announcements and the momentous transformations underway inside Sepah, it is clear that the country’s leaders believe the group can rise to the occasion once again. On 1 September, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced that Sepah Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi would leave his post after 10 years in office. He was to be replaced with Brigader (now Major) General Mohammad Ali Jafari, the former head of Sepah’s Center for Strategic Policymaking. This was followed by two other, equally significant, appointments. Brigader General Mohammad Hejazi, the famously doctrinaire head of the Basij militia, was to be the new chief of Sepah’s Joint Forces Command. General Aliakbar Ahmadian was to take Jafari’s old job. These are neither cosmetic nor routine changes. Although the changes are presently confined to Sepah’s command structure, several factors point to major transformations are in the works at the level of both strategic planning and organizational structure. First, it is highly unusual that the Supreme Leader personally changes a military officer lower in rank than the top commanding officer. He can and, when necessary, does change the chief commander since no one else is above that position. But lower ranking commanders are replaced by the top commander himself and only later approved by the Supreme Leader. Second, the job of the chief of Sepah’s Joint Forces, which is effectively the second most important post in Revolutionary Guards, is now part of the head of the Basij militia’s duties. Along with the militia, which is known for its revolutionary zeal, the joint forces consist of the navy, air force and Quds Army, but not the regular army. This shift in job duties is both symbolic and significant. As Sepah’s new chief, Jafari, said in a major speech to the group’s commanders: “Sepah’s mission is now the same as the Basij’s mission.” Thirdly, Jafari who is known to be a brilliant military strategist is regarded in Sepah as innovative and open to new ideas and military doctrines. Finally, Jafari is younger and, although an Islamicist to the core, comes from a different milieu than his predecessor. Safavi, before the revolution, was a member of a small Islamic armed cell that fought the Pahlavi regime. His world outlook, political alliance-making and sensibilities were different than Jafari’s. Welcome to a new Sepah These transformations did not materialize in a vacuum. In general, changes in the Islamic Republic are never by volition; they have come about thanks to important shifts at both the domestic and international level. Domestically, Sepah has seen - quite naturally - in the years following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, a diminution of its fighting spirit and “steadfastness.” As the revolutionary wave has subsisted and everyone has been encouraged to enjoy life and prosper financially, Iranian society has become more lax and far less revolutionary. This societal change has impacted Sepah in ways more than one. The situation is so serious that the corps rarely recruits from Tehran, which is seen by traditionalists as hedonistic and lax. In addition, Sepah’s move to the barracks following the revolution has severed ties with the populace. Reports of corruption, true or false, and the corps’ involvement in lucrative commercial and financial activities has also marred Sepah’s once-impeccably stellar image. To these must be added the possibility of social unrest or a rise in ethnic tensions. Jafari alluded to all these points in his 29 September speech. Internationally, the US is considering naming Sepah or its Quds Army offshoot as “a terrorist organization.” Such a designation would be a serious blow to the corps’ reputation and self-esteem. US President George W Bush is also seriously contemplating a surgical attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, which are formally under the protection of Sepah’s air force. Seymour Hersch in the 8 October issue of the US magazine The New Yorker gives a detailed description of White House plans for such an attentat. Hersch also says that Sepah’s command and communication centers may be targeted by US bombs and missiles as part of a counterterrorism campaign. The danger of a ground invasion, while rather improbable, cannot be discounted. Finally, a US-instigated destabilization campaign may not be far from the horizon. To deflect criticism of Sepah’s foreign involvements, Jafari said in his press conference that Sepah’s chief responsibility was suppressing internal threats. This was a rather curious statement. Sepah’s involvement overseas - through the Quds Army - is extensive and is in fact a source of great pride for it. In Iraq, the Quds Army has been stunningly successful in achieving Iran’s strategy of establishing a forward political and military base and in tying the US down. In Lebanon, Sepah’s ties with Hizbollah were decisive in blunting 33 days of merciless Israeli bombing. The changes for Sepah would begin at the national level, a process that may take a while. Only then would the group undertake a makeover of its international image. During this transitional period, the regular army would be given the official role of defending Iran’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. A foreshadowing of this came this week when - for the first time since after the war - during the annual the Week of Sacred Defense, it was the army which was given wide prominence in official ceremonies and TV programs. At this moment, Sepah is expected to attempt to begin a process of rejuvenation within its ranks. Under General Hejazi -former Basij chief - ideology, piety and the spirit of martyrdom will be emphasized far more strongly than before. Sepah would also take a more active part in civilian construction projects like building roads and dams. It has already undertaken many such projects - moves that were not publicized extensively.Asymmetric warfare Meanwhile, Sepah started preparing for a military showdown with the US even before Jafari’s recent appointment, and continues to do so. According to a 30 September report in the Iranian daily Kayhan, Safavi, Jafari’s predecessor, called the new war-fighting strategy a “mosaic” type of strategy.” On elaborating, he explained that under conditions of asymmetric military power, the best strategy to fight a technologically superior enemy is to form thousands of small irregular mobile units that can melt back into the population at a moment’s notice. This strategy that is perfected in Lebanon relies heavily on the “spirit of martyrdom,” which, according to Safavi, is Iran’s most potent weapon against an invading army. In the last three years, for instance, several thousand volunteers have signed up for suicide missions. In addition, the Basij militia itself is a unique fighting force in the world. Theoretically, Basij, which is a volunteer force, is present in every workforce, classroom and organization in the country. All members of Sepah are automatically Basij members. Officially, there are 12 million Basijis in Iran. The actual number is between two million and 2.5 million. About half have military training with perhaps 15 percent being full-time Sepah members.Iran’s second-strike capability. Iran’s deterrence power,which has so far given Bush, pause,comes from several sources: * Missiles: Iran is in possession of between several hundred and 1,000 short- and medium-range missiles. These include Sahab-1 and Sahab-2, which are upgrades of Scud-B and Scud-C’s. Their range is from 300 kilometers to 600 kilometers. These can easily target US bases in Iraq, Qatar and other places. The Sahab-3 missile is a new version of the Korean Nodong. With a range of up to 1,500 kilometers, it is more accurate and can reach Israel. The Sahab-3 weighs more than one tonne and Iran claims it is in possession of 600 of them. The actual number is probably around 50. In addition, Hizbollah is in possession of an unknown number of short-range missiles capable of hitting Tel Aviv. * The Iraqi theater: Iran has important military and political assets in Iraq. The Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr is among these. Al-Sadr’s forces are the most popular among ordinary Shi’as in southern Iraq. So far, Iran has not given the cleric permission to use shoulder-held missiles or anti-tank missiles. An attack on Iran would definitely change that. In addition, according to Vincent Cannistraro, a retired US Central Intelligence Agency officer, most of US supplies - up to 90 percent - in Iraq come from Kuwait through southern Iraq. So far, neither Iran nor al-Sadr have tried to disrupt that line. * Iran could wreak havoc on shipping routes in the Persian Gulf by using mines or attacking ships and tankers. It could also target selected oil installations. Under these circumstances, the price of oil could easily increase to the US$150- US$200 per barrel range. No one can predict with certainty if the sudden oil spike would cause a world recession. The day after the attack A successful aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear installations could set back the country’s nuclear program by several years. Ironically, such an attack could bring tangible benefits to Sepah and its clerical backers. First, Iran’s popularity among Musilms, even Sunnis, would rise dramatically. After all, there is so far no evidence of nefarious activities behind the nuclear program. Iran and Hizbollah are certain to escalate the fight by getting Israel involved in the conflict - even if Israel does not take part in the initial bombings. Thus, Iran would be David standing up to a US-Israeli Goliath. Both Khamenei and Iran’s Grand Ayatollahs would issue religious fatwas against Israel and the US. Iran would officially leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and announce that it would officially pursue nuclear arms to defend itself against future aggression. The re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be assured and the neo-Rightist forces would consolidate their power for many years to come. Chances of a reformist comeback would be, perhaps permanently, annulled. This would be accompanied with a general clampdown on the press, the dissidents - clerical or otherwise - and all civil society groups. A nationalist wave would sweep the country, and as far as Sepah is concerned, once it has launched its missiles and inflicted casualties on the “infidels,” it could infuse its depleted ranks with new and eager blood. Kamal Nazer Yasin is the pseudonym of an Iranian journalist reporting for ISN Security Watch from Tehran. MEANWHILE internal power struggles among the hardliners under current President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, the pragmatists under Rafsanjani and Khatami and the dying man caught in between, Supreme Ruler Ali Khamenei are escalating into open hostility among the Islamic leaders.