ISLAMIC TERRORISM & Britain

The emergence of Islamic terrorism has had a tremendous impact on the United Kingdom. The British government has pursued controversial domestic and foreign policies. A review of some of the key measures and also the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The continuous clashes between the different branches of government has undermined Britain's ability to contend with the threat raised by Islamic radicals, which is like no other. The British government decision to support the U.S.-led "War on Terror" placed the United Kingdom at the epicenter of the campaign, forcing the adoption of policies, strategies, programs, and other measures to deal with the Islamists--even though initially there was no indication that the UK was a target of al-Qa'ida. Unfortunately, the threat became a reality on July 7, 2005, when four British-Muslims undertook a suicide bombing campaign that left more than 50 people dead across central London, making July 7 the deadliest terror attack on British soil. Britain has since became a major target of al-Qa'ida and Islamists, with some security officials believing that Islamic radicals view "...7/7 as just the beginning." In a November 2006 speech, Director-General of MI5 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller claimed 200 terrorist networks involving at least 1,600 people and 30 "Priority 1" plots to kill had been identified. Only a few days after Manningham-Buller's speech, a senior Foreign Office counter-terrorism expert claimed that there was "no doubt at all" that al-Qa'ida was seeking nuclear technology to attack the West and Britain. The official added, "We know the aspiration is there, we know the attempt to get material is there, we know the attempt to get technology is there." Around the same time, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair stated, in a comment on the August 2006 transatlantic airline bomb plot, that "the apparent speed with which young, reasonably affluent, some reasonably well educated British-born people" had become radicalized and willing to commit mass murders through suicide attacks was worrying. Significantly, Manningham-Buller made it clear that due to al-Qa'ida's nature, the challenge faced by the security forces was substantial. This was seen with the Barot case, in which the plot was forged in one country, approved in another, and executed elsewhere. Overall, it is apparent that Britain is a key target of Islamist terrorism. Consequently, there has been a call to toughen up anti-terrorism laws. This move, however, is likely to be resisted by civil libertarians and Muslims who claim that Britain's anti-terrorism measures are already far too stringent. Britain's role in the global War on Terror has led to a fierce public debate over the country's participation. There have been mass demonstrations, the jailing of a British officer for refusing to serve in Iraq, a variety of legal challenges about detention and the powers of the state, and questions concerning integration and the soundness of the measures promoted by the government (such as immigration). It has also raised the issue of what it means to be British. However, most of the debate and the controversy have been over Britain's foreign policy. In the words of Inayat Bunglawala of the Muslim Council of Britain, "...the [British] government has been totally in denial about the impact of its own policies, especially foreign policies, and how they may have contributed to the growth in extremism. That's why the demand for a public inquiry must be crucial to any discussion of terrorism." Simply put, there are Muslims who feel that their community and the umma (Islamic nation) are ignored, neglected, or discriminated against by mainstream Western society. It is repeatedly noted by such Muslims that the plight of Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and most recently in Lebanon are often forgotten or ignored by the international community at large and the West in particular. Consequently, British Muslims have criticized various measures adopted by the UK government to counter the threat posed by al-Qa'ida. They feel that these measures coupled with the usage of such terms as "radical Muslim cleric" and "Islamic extremists" lead to the vilification of the Muslim community and to Islamophobia, which plays into the hands of the militants. At the other end, Muslim leaders such as Ahmad al-Rawi, president of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, declared at the Twenty-Third Congress of the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), "In Britain, where we are more than 2 million, there is less discrimination than in other countries. We may practice our religion completely. Young women wearing headscarves are very active at school or universities." An analysis of British counter-terrorism measures show that the British approach is based on four key elements: prevention (tackling the factors that lead to radicalization and terrorist recruitment); protection of British people and British interests; preparation in terms of ensuring that in the case of an attack, casualties would be minimized due to effective response; and the pursuit of terrorists and those who sponsor them. Under UK law, terrorism is regarded as a criminal act, with investigation and prevention falling on the shoulders of the police, while the security services focus on intelligence gathering and the investigation of covert, organized threats. The military's role within the domestic sphere could at best be defined as supporting the civilian mechanism. In foreign policy, the military plays a central role in counter-terrorism through its active military engagements with terrorists (combat) and nation-building, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The transformation of Britain's security apparatus has been impressive, especially since July 7, 2005, but the continuous clash between the various branches of government (particularly between the executive and the judiciary branches) coupled with inter-communal tensions makes the UK vulnerable not only to further acts of terrorism, but also as a potential breeding ground for terrorist recruitment. The British public must understand that the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and other Islamist terrorist groups is real and total. At present, there is a failure to appreciate that a global war is raging and that giving in to the Islamists would undermine contemporary and future world society. Abandoning Iraq and Afghanistan would allow the militants to focus their attention on topping the regimes and instituting a Shari'a-based system, as seen in Iran and previously in Afghanistan under the Taliban. The government must improve its public relations program to better educate the public of what the Islamists stand for, what they wish to achieve, and how their victory would impact the lives of people across the globe. DEFINING THE ENEMY: INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL There is considerable debate in academic and political circles as to how to describe the al-Qa'ida movement and those it inspires. There is a distinction between those who support the al-Qa'ida agenda wholeheartedly and take up arms to fulfill its mantra and those who decry the treatment received by the Muslim community at the hands of contemporary society. Thus, the terms "jihadists" or "Islamists" are preferred when discussing Muslims who strive for "pure Islam"--the strict adherence to Shari'a. Such Muslims are angry primarily at Arab regimes that they claim have abandoned the true ways of Islam while drawing support from the West and predominately the United States, who also give Israel unconditional support. It is, however, somewhat ironic that these Muslims are willing to use the liberal system as well as the comfort and security offered by Western society to recruit new members and support the jihadist mantra to ensure the emancipation of the Muslim world from the hands of the infidels. BRITAIN AND TERRORISM Britain has dealt with "terrorists" both domestically and internationally for centuries.The country's security apparatus made substantial gains against various terrorist organizations, especially Irish Republicans, arguably leading to their decision to renounce the use of violence. In the words of Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, "The UK's armed forces and police have gained invaluable experience and expertise in counterterrorism through three decades of involvement in the effort to suppress terrorism in Northern Ireland and its overspill into the British mainland." The emergence of Islamic terrorism of the al-Qa'ida model, however, is very new, as the religious conviction of these Muslims is so fierce that negotiation is impossible. Moreover, there is no direct or even indirect contact. It is not known where the jihadists are located, especially the al-Qa'ida hierarchy, who nowadays exist to inspire operations rather than undertake and design ones. Britain's Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Other Measures The horror and the fear caused by the indiscriminate, callous, and methodical act of violence that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, propelled the UK government to adopt an activist legislative program, while also making it clear (and even more so after the London bombings and French riots) that the root causes of terrorism must be studied in great depth. The House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs found that: ...the new terrorism legislation cannot and must not simply be a set of police and judicial powers. It must be part of an explicit broader anti-terrorism strategy. In the context of international terrorism, it must explicitly and specifically set out how British Muslim leaders will be supported in assisting British Muslims in resisting extremist views. Increasingly, however, the government has had to contend with an activist judiciary. This has led to tensions between the executive and the judicial branches brought about by the Courts" determination to ensure that Britain's War on Terror is conducted within the precepts of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Human Rights Act (1998), and other relevant international human rights instruments. Yet this position by the judiciary has led Prime Minister Blair to request that Home Secretary John Reid "...look again at whether primary legislation is needed to address the issue of court rulings which overrule the government in a way that is inconsistent with other EU countries' interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights." Blair has argued that there needs to be a "...balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to basic security," as he feels that "...although British judges should already take that balance into consideration, it's clear that sometimes they don't." The Terrorism Act (2000) The Terrorism Act (2000) is the principal counter-terrorism legislation in the UK. The act replaced and reformed previous temporary anti-terrorism legislation, making counter-terrorism measures permanent and applicable to all forms of terrorism, whether Irish, international, or domestic. Under the act, terrorism amounts to the use or threat of action where it "...is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or section of the public..." Moreover, the act designates the use or threat of action as "terrorism" if it is "...made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause." The "action" referred to in the act occurs if it involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public; or is designed to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. The act's other key measures deal with proscribing various terrorist organizations from operating in the United Kingdom while also enhancing the power of the police by providing it with greater powers to investigate terrorism, including wider stop and search powers and the power to detain people for up to 14 days (extended to 28 days under the 2006 Terrorism Act). The legislation further provides the police with the power to arrest a person whom the officer "reasonably suspects to be a terrorist." Under the Terrorism Act (2000), it is a criminal offense to incite terrorism; to seek or to provide training for terrorist purposes in the United Kingdom or overseas, and to provide instruction or training in the use of firearms, explosives, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The issue of incitement has been very difficult, creating clashes between the liberal tradition, which focuses on free speech, and the need for security and authority. At the heart of the debate lies the Human Rights Act (1998), which guarantees freedom of speech, though the right is not absolute. The act has been used on various occasions to challenge government legislation, policies, and programs dealing directly or indirectly with the War on Terror. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2001) On December 14, 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2001) received its Royal Assent and became law. The act was a reaction to September 11, and its aim was to ensure that the UK government had sufficient powers to contend with a similar threat. The key features of the new legislation were the cutting off of terrorist funding; ensuring cooperation and sharing of information to counter a terrorist threat between government agencies and departments; streamlining appropriate immigration procedures; protecting the nuclear and aviation industries; improving the security of dangerous substances that terrorists may wish to acquire; extending the powers of the police; ensuring that the UK meets its European obligations in the area of police and judicial cooperation; and updating the UK's anti-terrorist powers. The House of Lords, by a vote of eight to one, dealt a blow to the act when it ruled that Part IV (Immigration and Asylum) breached the articles of the European Commission on Human Rights that relate to the right to liberty and the right to freedom from discrimination. The ruling forced the government to reconsider its counter-terrorism policies vis-a-vis dangerous and undesirable elements. It also meant that the Lords quashed the Human Rights Act of 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, which allowed the UK to opt out of Article 5(1)(f) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The significance of the ruling was its emphasis that, at least to their Lordships, the threat from Islamists was not severe enough as to amount to a public emergency necessitating that the State adopt such draconian measures as internment. In the words of Lord Hoffman, "Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community." His Lordship concluded. "The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these." The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) The government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) following the December 2004 House of Lords ruling. The legislation introduced control orders against any suspected terrorist, whether UK nationals or non-UK nationals or whether the suspected action was domestic or international. The "control orders" appear in two forms: a strict form that requires the UK government to opt out ("derogation") of Article 5 of the ECHR; or "control orders" that are not sufficiently harsh and therefore do not require a derogation from ECHR. The "control orders" permit the authorities to impose conditions on individuals, which range from prohibiting access to specific items or services (such as the use of the internet), restriction on movement to or within certain areas, restrictions on communications and associations, and curfews (the "orders" do not mean "house arrest"). The aim of the "control orders" is to deal with each case on its merits, as the government has come to realize that each situation poses a different risk. The Secretary of State normally requires a court order to impose a "control order," although in an emergency the order may be issued first, with the Court later confirming the order's legality. The are a number of issues with "control orders," especially as prima facie they challenge a number of Articles in ECHR, which include freedom of expression (Article 10), freedom of association (Article 11), the right to privacy (Article 8), and so on. Consequently, there is substantial concern within human rights circles that the act and its measures are too draconian. The Home Secretary, for example, can issue "control orders" for indefinite periods through a very secretive process in which the standard of proof is lower than that used in criminal law (it is based on a "balance of probabilities rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt," which is the standard use in the latter). Ultimately a "control order" restricts an individual's rights, and, therefore, it could be argued that the threshold for issuing such an order requires a criminal standard rather than a civil one. The act limits the powers of the court by providing it primary responsibility to determine whether the Home Secretary has acted beyond his/her power. The government, in an attempt to appease human rights groups, civil libertarians, and members of the judiciary has responded by accepting a quarterly review of "control orders," with members of the review group coming from the intelligence and law enforcement communities. However, these measures have failed to appease the judiciary. This was seen in a recent Court of Appeal ruling in which the Lord Chief Justice Phillips of Worth Matravers; Master of Rolls Sir Anthony Clarke, and President of the Queen's Bench Division Sir Igor Judge held that "control orders" restricting the individual to an 18-hour confinement amounts to "deprivation of liberty," contrary to Article 5 of the Convention, which bans indefinite detention without trial. Terrorism Act (2006) On March 30, 2006, the new Terrorism Act received its Royal Assent. The principle focus of the act was to deal with those propagating extremist activities. The government introduced the offense of encouraging terrorism (terrorism being defined under section 1 of the 2000 Terrorism Act). This is due to Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (the "Convention"), which requires states to have an offense of "public provocation to commit a terrorist act." Thus, under the act, a person commits an offense if they publish a statement that induces another to commit, prepare, or instigate the act of terrorism or Convention offenses. An important feature in the act is the issue of the glorification of terrorism. Under the act, it is an offense to provide a statement that glorifies (glorification is defined in section 20 of the act) the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offenses. However, the act makes it clear that the offense is committed only if "members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances." When determining how the statement is likely to be understood by the public, it is necessary to look at the contents of the statement as a whole as well as the circumstances and manner of its publication. On the dissemination issue, the act covers books and other publications, including material on the internet. The dissemination must, however, be conducted either intentionally or recklessly, and its purpose must be to encourage or induce a terrorist act, or the individual's conduct would provide assistance in the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. Conduct includes such things as distributing, circulating, giving, selling, lending, or offering to sell a terrorist publication. It also includes providing a service to others to enable them to obtain, read, listen, or look at a terrorist publication, or to acquire it as a gift, sale, loan, electronically, and so on. The act introduced two new offenses to the statute book, making it an offense to prepare a terrorist act or to train for terrorism. The preparation aspect of the act builds on the common law offense of conspiracy to carry out or attempt a terrorist act. The act of preparation involves a person who has the mens rea while being caught, for example, with materials that may be used for terrorism purposes, though not immediately. This is a development from the common law, under which the offense of an attempt occurs if the acts committed are more than merely preparatory, while the offense of conspiracy provides that an agreement to commit an offense must have occurred. Section 6 of the act covers the issue of training, which initially was dealt with in section 54 of the Terrorism Act of 2000 and relates to training in the use of or the making of firearms and explosives, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Under section 6(1), a person commits the offense of training if they provide instructions or training in the making, handling, or use of a noxious substance or any other device, method, or technique that may be used for the purpose of terrorism. Relating to the issue of training, it is an offense to attend a place used for terrorist training in the UK or elsewhere. The Terrorism Act of 2006 came in the midst of tremendous controversy for covering such issues as glorification of terrorism and the detention of a suspect for 28 days without charge, although any detention for longer than 48 hours requires judicial oversight. These two features in the act drew substantial criticism from both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, not to mention a number of Labour MPs, claiming that "glorification" was defined too broadly, while the detention of an individual for 28 days was viewed as being too draconian. Gareth Crossman, the Policy Director of Liberty has declared, "These new powers [Terrorism Act 2006] make us not only less free, we are also less safe when we drive dissent underground and alienate minorities. Swept up in this new anti-terror safety net could be those who protest against dictators like Zimbabwe's Mugabe or North Korean dissidents." Britain's Role in the Combating of Terrorism Financing The challenge of countering terrorism finances is enormous because of the complexity and very nature of the financial world, which operates in secrecy, coupled with various national interests. At the same time, the defeat of international terrorism is heavily reliant on destroying terrorists' financial means. Terrorists use cash for such purposes as recruitment, training, travel, and material, coupled with the occasional need to pay for safe haven protection. Consequently, the international community has placed a high premium on strengthening control over international finance. The British campaign against terrorist financing rests on the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations. There is substantial involvement by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG), the Financial Service Authority (FSA), and the Financial Services and Market Act (2000). The JMLSG is composed of the UK's leading Trade Associations in the Financial Services Industry (banks, building societies, credit institutions, investment firms as defined by the Financial Service Act of 1986, insurance companies, and so on). It aims to advance good practices in countering money laundering while also assisting in interpreting the UK's and EC Money Laundering Regulations, primarily through the publication of Guidance Notes, which it has been doing since 1990. The FSA is an independent, non-governmental agency operating under the Financial Services and Market Act (2000), which regulates the financial services with the intention of ensuring that retail consumers receive a fair deal through the promotion of an efficient, orderly, and fair market from the financial services industry. In the realm of money laundering, the FSA has laid out various regulations and demands that come within its jurisdiction to prevent money laundering operations. The system received a boost with the passing of the 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) and the Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (MLR). POCA created an Asset Recovery Agency (ARA), but more importantly, it replaced the five primary and secondary pieces of legislation dealing with money laundering. The act created three principal offenses, which dealt with concealing, disguising, converting, transferring, or removing criminal property from England, Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland. The second offense is that of arranging, which calls for establishing that a person entered into or became concerned with an arrangement that they knew or suspected would facilitate another to acquire, retain, use, or control criminal property, and that the person concerned also knew or suspected that the property constituted or represented benefit from criminal conduct. The final offense is that of acquiring and using, which is committed when the property acquired (used or possessed) constitutes or represents a benefit from crime. In November 2001, the UK government formed the Terrorist Finance Unit (TFU), operating from within the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) to provide financial intelligence packages for further investigation. The TFU is composed of personnel from law enforcement, regulatory, and intelligence agencies with the aim of examining financial disclosures submitted to NCIS for possible terrorist connections and to combine the data with intelligence from other sources. The combined financial intelligence packages are then referred for further investigative work by the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU) and other intelligence agencies. The second task of the TFU is to "...work with law enforcement and intelligence agencies to develop intelligence led methodologies to help inform future work on terrorist financing and where appropriate share with and provide guidance to the financial sector." The Terrorism Act (2000) has endeavored to deal with terror financing through the creation of four main offenses in relation to terror funding, which apply to situations when a person intends or has reasonable cause to believe that money or property would be used for terrorist purposes. Under section 15, it is an offense to invite anyone to provide money or property, or to receive money or property, for the purpose of terrorism. Section 16 makes it an offense to use or possess money or property for the purpose of terrorism. The act also aims to deal with the facilitation of funds for terror purposes and money laundering, making any involvement in such activities an offense. That is, under section 18, it is an offense for a person to enter or to become involved in an arrangement that facilitates the use of property, whether by concealment, removal from jurisdiction, transfer to a nominee, or by any other way. The act allows one to argue that one did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the arrangement related to a terrorist property. Moreover, the act places a responsibility on a person to inform the authorities, to disclose knowledge or information acquired through one's business, profession, trade, or employment of terrorist funding. Britain's Security Apparatus Primary responsibility for the United Kingdom's security lies with the Cabinet Office and the Central Government machinery, which directs the rest of government's efforts in the realm of battling the threat of terrorism. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) coordinates the government's emergency operation. It is composed of the deputy prime minister; the cabinet secretary; the foreign secretary; the chancellor; the defense secretary; the home secretary; the chief of defense staff; the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee; the chief foreign policy adviser to the prime minister. And, on an ad hoc basis, the director-general of the Security Service; the director-general of the Secret Intelligence Service; the director of communications and strategy in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO); the director of government relations in the PMO; and the chief of staff in the PMO. In June 2002, the same year that the government initiated its counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST, Tony Blair appointed Sir David Omand to be Britain's first security and intelligence coordinator, a post equivalent to the U.S. secretary for Homeland Security. The brief of the coordinator involves coordinating the work of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, while also serving on the joint intelligence committee to ensure that poor intelligence and coordination between the various security and intelligence agencies would not lead to another September 11. The Security Services The United Kingdom has three national intelligence and security services ("agencies") that direct Britain's counter-terrorism program. The first agency, and the one entrusted with primary responsibility for British national security is the Security Service (MI5), which is Britain's internal intelligence agency. It is responsible for gathering information on and assessing covert threats such as terrorism, espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the United Kingdom, as long as they are domestic. The Security Service is under the authority of the home secretary. The second agency is the Government's Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), located in Cheltenham. GCHQ operates under the foreign secretary's remit. Its key responsibility is to intercept and decode communications and other signals that are used to create signals intelligence (SIGINT). GCHQ also advises government departments, the armed forces, and private industry on communications security. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), or MI6, is the third agency in the matrix, and it operates as Britain's external intelligence agency. It uses human and technical sources and liaisons with foreign security services to produce secret intelligence on political, military, and economic issues. The Foreign Secretary oversees the operations of MI6. The Intelligence Services Act (1994) established the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which oversees the Agencies. The ISC examines the expenditure, administration, and policy of the agencies. Other important bodies involved in British counter-terrorism are the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC). The JIC is the Committee of Agency Heads and senior officials from government departments whose responsibility is to provide ministers and officials with intelligence assessment on matters pertaining to national security, defense, and foreign affairs. JIC also shoulders the responsibility of formulating the annual statement of the UK's Requirements and Priorities for secret intelligence collection, analysis, and assessment. The statement lays out regional and thematic requirements, which are then prioritized to reflect which issues are most important and therefore demand the greatest intelligence effort. JTAC, established in June 2003, produces analyses on Islamist terrorist threats. The center provides short-term assessments of the level of threat and longer-term assessments of terrorist networks, capabilities, and threats. Special Branch, also known as SO12, has played a central role in the campaign to ensure Britain's national security. However, since September 11, and even more so following the July 7 bombings, the Metropolitan Police undertook a review of its counter-terrorism activities, which eventually led to the merging of Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13) on October 2, 2006. The new force, known as the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15), was created with the purpose of combining intelligence analysis and development with investigation and operational support activity. The merge comes because it has become increasingly apparent that the two functions--intelligence gathering and operational activity--need to exist under a single command. Thus, SO15, with 1,500 officers, is responsible for a variety of areas, the key ones being to bring to justice those engaged in terrorist, domestic, extremist, and related offenses and to provide a proactive and reactive response to such offenses, including the prevention and disruption of terrorist activity, supporting the national coordinator of Terrorist Investigations outside London, and so on. Counter-Terrorism Exercises Emergency exercise programs have been in operation for decades, as they cover natural disasters, accidents, and man-made incidents (terrorism). The UK government and the emergency services soon after September 11 intensified their "counter-terrorism exercises," which had been in existence since the emergence of Irish terrorism in the late 1960s. However, as the al-Qa'ida movement poses a more of a global threat, the UK has had to change some of its counter-terrorism exercises to cover the danger. The British authorities have adopted a policy of preparedness involving counter-terrorism exercises in the UK and also are working with other countries and organizations to battle terrorism outside of the UK. On the domestic front, Britain's emergency and security services have embarked on a number of initiatives in the hope of making the country safer by practicing how best to deal with conventional or unconventional terrorist attacks. In April 2004, Exercise Atlantic Blue took place. The objectives of Atlantic Blue were to test existing procedures for domestic incident management in the event of a terrorist attack involving chemical and/or biological weapons, while also testing security weaknesses in the London transport system. It also sought to practice the joint response of the British, American, and Canadian government to media handling and public information in the event of a terrorist attack. Finally, the exercises tested the flow of information among UK, U.S., and Canadian agencies. A year before, in September 2003, the financial district of London saw police, ambulance, and fire service personnel--wearing gas masks and chemical suits--in a simulated chemical attack on the underground network. The aim of the operation was to examine how the emergency services would work together and to assess the effectiveness of new equipment purchased in the aftermath of September 11. The situation vis-a-vis counter-terrorism took a different form following July 7, 2005, which emphasized that terrorism posed not only a clear and present danger to the United Kingdom, but also that jihadist terrorist cells were operating within the UK. This has led to a number of initiatives by the UK authorities to educate people about the threat of terrorism, but more importantly about being prepared in the event of another attack. Britain's MI5 issued a booklet entitled "Protecting against Terrorism," which laid out the top ten protective security measures that individuals and businesses could take in order to protect themselves. At the forefront, is the issue of risk assessment, which deals with identifying the threats, establishing actions that must be taken to protect oneself, and understanding one's vulnerabilities. The risk assessment also deals with what measures could be taken to enhance security, such as the placement of CCTV, locks, and alarms; and finally, calls for continuous review and rehearsal of security plans. The other measures suggested by MI5 include better recruitment procedures, which involve accepting only official, not photocopied documents, and follow-up on curriculum vitas. Internationally, Britain has continued to play a role in NATO counter-terrorism and security operations through such operations as Operation Active Endeavour, which has been run by NATO's Mediterranean Task Force since September 2001. The operation protects the shipping in the Mediterranean region that is vital for global and British national interests (98 percent of UK imports and exports travel by sea, and 30 percent of world maritime trade passes through the Mediterranean Sea). The second focus of the operation is to search for and prevent terrorism, especially as it is known that al-Qa'ida has a maritime cell, as was seen with the attack on the USS Cole. To this end, 75,000 ships have been monitored and over 100 have been boarded. In April 2006, NATO held Exercise Brilliant Mariner 2006 for the Maritime Component Command, which is part of the NATO Reaction Force (NRF). Commander in Chief Fleet and Commander Allied Maritime Component Command, Northwood (MCC Northwood) Admiral Sir James Burnell-Nugent commanded the exercise. As part of the exercise, ships from the NATO Reaction Force sailed from the Netherlands to Southern Norway, where they executed a mock evacuation of civilians (NEO--Non-Combatant Evacuation Phase). The Social Dimension: The Challenge of Finding an Equilibrium The events in London on July 7, 2005, placed the debate about integration and "Britishness" at the heart of the War on Terror. The realization that the four London bombers were either British-born or British-based has forced people to understand that there are those who have embraced the al-Qa'ida mantra to such an extent that they are willing to kill and injure for their beliefs. This is a marked transition from a period when the United Kingdom embraced the unwanted and undesired in the name of freedom, as the country became the preferred choice of those escaping persecution. Unfortunately, it is this tolerance that allowed Muslim dissenters from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and other countries to move to Britain, where they have continued to propagate their views and attract new converts to their cause, as they have sought changes in their home countries. British tolerance allowed militant Islamists to receive asylum status. One such example is Abu Qatada, who was granted asylum in 1993, despite entering the UK on a forged United Arab Emirates passport. The man considered as "Osama Bin Ladin's right-hand man in Europe" was allowed to preach his brand of militant Islam until he was detained in October 2002, under emergency counter-terrorism orders. Ironically, Britain's commitment to international law ensures that Qatada's deportation became hard and attracted much criticism from civil libertarians because of concern that his human rights (as defined by Western jurisprudence) would be breached by Jordan, which tried him in absentia for a variety of terror-related offenses. Other notable figures who settled in the UK are Abu Doha, an Algerian believed to be bin Ladin's key man in the UK; Khalid al-Fawwaz, the founder of the Advice and Reformation Committee; and Yasir al-Sirri, the founder of the Islamic Observation Center. The two most notorious militant Islamists to win asylum in Britain were Shaykh Omar Bakri Muhammad and Shaykh Abu Hamza. The two used British liberal laws to establish charities, associations, organizations, and networks as they promoted their version of Islam. Since September 11, the UK authorities have conducted a variety of studies and initiatives focused on improving race and community relations between mainstream British society and the Muslim community, which often feels disadvantaged. The Home Affairs Committee has held that "The threat of international terrorism brings a new dimension to existing issues, and perhaps makes their resolution even more pressing--it does not change them." The British position has been that terrorism cannot be combated by force alone, as it requires dealing with the grievances of the weak, the dispossessed, and the poor--who are exploited by nefarious elements who direct the anger of the aforementioned people towards the West, for example. In the words of the House of Common Select Committee on Defense, "Tackling global inequalities and injustices must be part of a long term strategy to starve terrorist groups of their support." On the social domestic front, it has been argued that lax morality has encouraged young Muslims unhappy with the permissiveness of British society to fall into the allure of Islamists who preach against such a state of affairs. This was seen with Zacarias Moussaoui who arrived in London in 1992 to attend a postgraduate degree in business studies. His mother, Aisha al-Wafi, claims that her son, while living in France, drank alcohol and enjoyed French society, but once in London, he fell under the spell of Islamic militants who were free to preach their intolerant ideology. This view has been supported by Moussaoui's brother, Abd-Samad, who said, "I believe that Britain has fed a snake at its bosom, and has been bitten by the snake." Once under the spell of militant Islam, Moussaoui began to attend a mosque in Brixton, where he was drawn into a group of Muslim extremists. Among these was Richard Reid, the "shoe-bomber." Moussaoui moved into an apartment with David Cortellier, who was later convicted in France of assisting terrorism. From the Brixton mosque, Moussaoui and others moved to the infamous Finsbury Mosque. There they attended the lecture of Abu Hamza. In 1995, Moussaoui headed to Afghanistan and then Chechnya, where he became a jihadist. It is very clear that since September 11, there has been a concrete effort by various government departments, committees, and citizen groups to ensure greater social cohesion in the UK. The process has been defined largely by the Cantle Commission, which conducted a comprehensive study into community cohesion in the UK following a number of disturbances in various towns in England in the summer of 2001. The commission produced 67 recommendations on how to improve community cohesion, which it defined in a sense much broader than merely economics; it also looked into such areas as education, employment, poverty, social inequalities, social and cultural diversity, and access to communication and information technologies. However, when turning to the July 7 bombers, it is difficult to see how community cohesion could have prevented the atrocity. The official report into the bombing emphasizes that the four men were well-integrated into British society and that they were open about their religious views. The report states "...there was little outward sign that this had spilled over into potentially violent extremism." Moreover, "...there is little in their backgrounds which mark them out as particularly vulnerable to radicalization, with the possible exception of Lindsay." On the social cohesion front it is becoming abundantly clear that mainstream British society is increasingly at odds with the devout Muslim community that resides within the United Kingdom. The heart of the problem is that devout Muslims reject the fundamentals that lie at the epicenter of traditional liberal society, which embraces and encourages pluralism. British Foreign Policy: Going After The Terrorists and State-Building Britain's position as America's staunchest ally won it both friends and enemies. The British position was defined in the July 2002 issue of The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter to the Strategic Review, which explored the threat of "strategic effect terrorism" and the "impact of technological change in the military." At the heart of The Strategic Defence Review lies the age-old premise that the "enemy" (terrorists) should be fought outside of the United Kingdom, which means that significant forces need to be ready to mobilize against terrorists or those who harbor them. The Afghan Campaign The British government supported the American decision to dispatch troops to Afghanistan to apprehend Usama bin Ladin and topple the Taliban regime that gave him sanctuary. The campaign against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban led the UK government to assume a dual role in Afghanistan: The UK supported the U.S.-led military campaign, Operation Enduring Freedom (a counter-terrorism operation that is part of the U.S.-led global War on Terror). The UK also played a major role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan through the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and also through the Department of International Development. The operation centers on the belief that ensuring security in Afghanistan would prevent terrorists from re-establishing a presence in the country. As former Secretary of Defense John Reid, stated: We cannot risk Afghanistan again becoming a sanctuary for terrorists. We have seen where that leads, be it in New York or in London. We cannot ignore the opportunity to bring security to a fragile but vital part of the world, and we cannot go on accepting Afghan opium being the source of 90 per cent of the heroin that is applied to the veins of the young people of this country. For all those reasons, it is in our interests, as the United Kingdom and as a responsible member of the international community, to act. Under the UK's first responsibility of fighting the spread of global Islamic terrorism, the government supported the American view that the Taliban regime was harboring and supporting the al-Qa'ida network. With the support of the Northern Alliance, a campaign to oust the Taliban then began. ISAF, which the UK was first to lead, operates under UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003), and UN Security Council Resolution 1623 (2005), with the aim of enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. The international community has come to realize that "failed states" require considerable assistance if they are to join the international community. Consequently, there is a strong British (and international) presence in Afghanistan, and with the dispatch of British troops to southern Afghanistan, there has also been intensification in British-Taliban engagements. During May 2006, Allied forces in the Kandahar and Helmand provinces killed over 300 Taliban fighters. There has been a firm commitment by the UK government towards reconstruction, with Tony Blair declaring in January 2002, "We are not here just for today, tomorrow, next week." Consequently, the United Kingdom, beyond the dispatching of troops, has provided Afghanistan with over a £1 billion since 2001, with the money going to such programs as humanitarian assistance, state-building, and other such measures. Britain's key responsibility within the ISAF mandate is in the realm of counter-narcotics. This is a significant job, because Afghanistan produces around 87 percent of the world's opium, providing a net income of around $2.7 billion, which the Taliban use to finance much of their campaign. The UK has spent over £100 million between 2003 and 2006 on activities to reduce opium production in Afghanistan, which included £30 million in 2005 alone in emergency support to help farmers and others suffering hardship as a result of the reduction in poppy cultivation. The 2006 decision to place ISAF troops in southern and eastern Afghanistan has meant that the distinction between the international operation (ISAF) and the U.S.-led campaign to oust the Taliban has become blurred. The new deployment has placed ISAF and the contributing countries under tremendous stress, because the region is infested with al-Qa'ida and Taliban fighters. As a result, there has been a rise in ISAF casualties, as it has come to deal more with Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives. This also impacts on domestic politics of the ISAF countries, although nothing on the scale that Iraq generates. There seems to be, in British circles at least, more of a willingness to operate in Afghanistan than in Iraq. This is despite a recent claim by Muhammad Hanif, the Taliban spokesman and a close aid of Mullah Muhammad Omar that the Taliban are at war with the British. Hanif has declared, "The British are not here as peacekeepers. They are here with the occupier, the American superpower. They are allied with the superpower so we don't care about them. If they are with the Americans we can and will fight face to face." There is little doubt that what has taken place in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban has been remarkable. The country, after years of misrule, abuse, civil war, and violence, appears on the path from being a "failed state" to a fully functioning member of the international community. Since 2001, the country has elected a president, adopted a working constitution, and held full democratic parliamentary elections. However, the job is far from complete and explains why the UK government has suggested that the British presence would continue in Afghanistan for at least three years. At the same time, in provinces like Helmand, the situation is far from idyllic. There is a weak central authority, rampant corruption across the board, defunct government departments, and abundance in weaponry--all of which have allowed the Taliban to retain a presence. In a recent interview with the London Times, Mullah Muhammad Qasim Farouqi, the Taliban commander at Helmand, claimed to have between two to three thousand men under his command, with thousands more willing to heed his call to take up arms to free Afghanistan from the "infidels." In the words of one Taliban member, "We will fight until we die. We don't care if we win or lose. Our only goal is to do jihad. If you look at history you will see we have defeated the British three times despite their equipment being 30 times stronger. If we tolerate some losses we will be able to beat them again." Such statements, coupled with the rise of militancy along the southern Afghan-Pakistani border, emphasize that the challenge before the international community is far from over. It appears as if the Taliban had taken a conscious decision to actively engage British forces in southern Afghanistan. Their hope was that British casualties would lead to a British withdrawal, which would severely undermine the international alliance against the War on Terror, in which Britain plays a central role. The Iraqi Campaign Tony Blair's decision for the UK to join the American effort to topple the Saddam regime has been equated with Munich (1938) and Suez (1956). In other words, this was a defining moment in British foreign policy. Blair's decision emphasized the hold Atlanticism has over British foreign policy, which rests on the premise of a "special relationship" between the United States and the UK. The War on Terror and specifically the campaign in Iraq have largely altered the Blairite agenda, which in 1997 centered on improving economic prosperity and enhancing social justice. Tony Blair in his speech outside of 10 Downing Street on May 2, 1997, made it clear that his focus would be on improving Britain's education, modernizing the health services, cleaning up British politics from the corruption of the Major years, and most importantly uniting the country. Nine years later, the situation appears very different. The country is just as divided, with increasing inquiry about the questionable practices and continuous dissatisfaction with the education and health services. Operation Telic, the British name for American Operation Iraqi Freedom, has gone through considerable changes since it began on March 20, 2003. The actual military campaign against the Saddam regime lasted for about a month before Saddam was toppled. The British contribution to the campaign was around 40,000 service personnel, including naval, ground, and air forces. British and American troops secured the Faw peninsula as well as the Rumaylah oil fields, with British forces also taking control of the strategically important city of Basra. The major combat operations ended in April 2003, and since then the UK has remained in Iraq, playing a central in the reconstruction (loosely defined to include security as well) of Iraq. The continuous presence of British forces in Iraq, without the government stating categorically when the troops would leave, has caused much anger and opposition. Blair has sought to fight against such outcries, claiming that the purpose of the British presence in Iraq is to promote democracy in that country. In the words of Defense Secretary Des Brown, British troops will remain in Iraq "...until the Iraqi government is confident that the Iraqi security forces are capable of providing security without assistance from the coalition forces." This has not, however, prevented the leaking of a recent top-secret memorandum from the JIC that argued that the British involvement in Iraq has made Britain the target of terrorists for years to come. This challenged Blair's assertion that in reconstructing Iraq and making it democratic, the UK was in fact protecting itself from unsavory elements. Evidence for this has not been so clear cut due to the nature of the challenge; however, what is apparent is that there is growing anger amongst Muslims in the UK and around the globe over British involvement in Iraq. CONCLUSION There is little doubt that Britain has gone through a significant transformation in terms of its counter-terrorism preparedness since September 11, 2001, and July 7, 2005. British policymakers have endeavored to adjust to the new world order by adopting tougher legislation dealing with militantization, radicalization, and the promotion of terrorism. This attitude has arisen because of the recognition that a threat exists against the United Kingdom, as seen with the May 2006 announcement that MI5 had uncovered as many as twenty "major conspiracies" by Islamist terrorists. Following the June 2006 Forrest Gate raid, a British counter-terrorism expert claimed, "We're going to see more ops of this kind. The threat to this country is so high that you cannot afford to take a chance." In terms of countering the threat of international Islamic terrorism, the security agencies-- specifically MI5 and MI6--have had to transform their apparatus and thinking in the post- September 11 world, as previously the only significant international terrorist act to have plagued the United Kingdom was the Lockerbie bombing of December 1988. That is, throughout the 1990s, British counter-terrorism efforts centered on curtailing Irish terrorism. This was in spite of the growing awareness from the mid-1990s that London was becoming a "hotbed" for Islamic militants who used the capital to promote, fund, and plan terrorist acts in the Middle East and around the globe. Despite these developments, the British authorities, including the security forces, failed to appreciate the al-Qa'ida threat. The campaign to strengthen Britain's position in the War on Terror has suffered due to lack of cohesion. Decisions made by the executive branch are increasingly coming under criticism from the public, the legislature, and the judiciary. The judiciary, for instance, has been playing a very prominent role, as seen by the recent disclosure that more than 230 foreigners identified by MI5 and Scotland Yard as suspected terrorists have been allowed to stay in the UK as asylum seekers. Moreover, it is apparent that the legal system is under pressure when it comes to terrorist trials, with more than 90 terror suspects awaiting trial. On the social policy front, there is no doubt that more needs to happen in terms of interfaith dialogue and social inclusion programs. At the same time, however, politicians and community leaders should not be afraid to express their views and concerns about certain issues relating to Islam, as seen in October 2006 with Jack Straw and his view on the niqab. Straw should be commended, because as one minister is reported to have said, "We need an honest debate: how much is it reasonable for Muslims to allow the State to adapt to their religion. We can't just say 'yes' to everything." The lack of cohesion that is apparent in Britain makes the country appear divided, which fuels the terrorists' campaign, as they feel that they are winning the war. As bin Ladin himself said, "...what prompted me to speak are the repeated fallacies of your President Bush in his comment on the outcome of the U.S. opinion polls, which indicated that the overwhelming majority of you want the withdrawal of the forces from Iraq, but he objected to this desire and said that the withdrawal of troops would send a wrong message to the enemy." These words could be directed at the British public as much as they were directed towards the American people. It is increasingly argued that it was the desire to control access to oil or the agenda of the American neoconservatives that led the War on Terror. Such views are naive at best, if not downright dangerous, and give credence to those Americans who believe that their country is isolated in the international community and that everyone is against the United States. The British government, which has generally stood by the American administration, has also come to adopt a "trench mentality," making it less likely to seek allies (internally and externally) and work multilaterally--an essential ingredient when confronting international terrorism. Moreover, further efforts must be made to explain that the campaign in Iraq is not solely about fighting terrorism but also about nation- and state-building. The idea of a democratic Iraq would have substantial ramifications for the Gulf region and the Arab world in general, in that it would be a beacon of liberalism and would show that it is possible to have an Islamic country without the repression that one sees in Saudi Arabia or Iran. Iraq could become a symbol of a successful state under which Islam and politics coexist. The British government needs to develop a public relations program that better explains the need for tough measures against Islamists internally and externally, while also emphasizing that these individuals require specialist attention because of the threat that they pose. The danger of an al-Qa'ida sleeper cell operating in the UK with the intention of detonating a dirty bomb must be transmitted more clearly. This is especially important, as it yet to be understood what turns individuals into Islamists to the extent that they would not only take their own lives, but those of innocent civilians as well. The four men who committed the July 7 bombings appear to have turned to radicalization while they were in the UK. The British public must appreciate the extent of the threat that the al-Qa'ida network poses, as it seems that the belief is that once Britain ends its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, Britain will cease to be target. This is a fallacy! The international community is facing a global challenge in which a small group of radicals want to transform the world; in the minds of Islamists nothing but the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate will do. Such an end would have an immense impact on the global community, as the regions sought by the Islamists are of great strategic importance. The public must remember the mantra of Abdallah Azzam, bin Ladin's mentor: "Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogues." Isaac Kfir holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. He teaches at the Raphael Recanati School of the Interdisciplinary Center and is an associate at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism Policy (ICT).

IRAN'S SECURITY APPARATUS

(Sidebar comments in Green or Red) Iran's main security and intelligence has VEVAK as the abbreviation from the Persian name meaning MInistry of Information and Security of the Country. Also nown in English as MOIS (MInistry of Information and Security). The heir to the Shah's national security SAVAK is also known as SAVAMA these days. Many of the SAVAMA agents used to be SAVAK employees and stayed on under the Mullahs. These days, remembering the "good old days" they are often at odds with the clerics. VEVAK learned its methodology from the Soviet KGB and many of the Islamist revolutionaries who supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini actually studied at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, the Oxford of terrorism. (The Soviets had over a dozen urban guerilla psychologists and tactitians working from their Tehran Embassy to orchestrate the overthrow of the Monarchy. They intended their Marxit-Islamist surrogates, the MEK - Mojaheddeni-e Khalgh to come to power but the clerics, with the only national network in the form of mosques, once the government offices crumbed, stole the revolution away). Documented Iranian alumni include the current Supreme Leader (the faqih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, under whose Velayat-e Faqih (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent) apparatus it has traditionally operated. Its current head is Cabinet Minister Hojatoleslam Gholam-Hussein Mohseni-Ezhei, a graduate of Qom's Haqqani School, noted for its extremist position advocating violence against enemies and strict clerical control of society and government. (During the recent arrest of Ayatollah Boroujerdi in Tehran for coming out in opposition to the Mullocracy, Ezhei promised Supreme Ruler tobring the Ayatollahs head to him on a platter before dawn. One of the supposedly ardent anti-Islamic regime proponents vehemently attacked someone who reported this, stating that the Islamic government would NEVER say something like that. Inferring the Mullahs were too honorable to be like that!) The Ministry is very well funded and its charge, like that of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (the Pasdaran) is to guard the revolutionary Islamic Iranian regime at all costs and under all contingencies. From the KGB playbook, VEVAK learned the art of disinformation. It's not so difficult to learn: tell the truth 80% of the time and lie 20%. Depending on how well a VEVAK agent wants to cover his/her tracks, the ratio may go up to 90/10, but it never drops below the 80/20 mark as such would risk suspicion and possible detection. The regime in Teheran has gone to great lengths to place its agents in locations around the world. Many of these operatives have been educated in the West, including the U.K. and the United States. Iranian government agencies such as embassies, consulates, Islamic cultural centers, and airline offices regularly provide cover for the work of VEVAK agents who dress well and are clean shaven, and move comfortably within our society. In this country (USA), because of the severance of diplomatic relations, the principal site of VEVAK activities begins at the offices of Iran's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. Teheran has worked diligently to place its operatives in important think tanks and government agencies in the West. Some of its personnel have been recruited while in prison through torture or more often through bribery, or a combination of both. Journalist Akbar Ganji (former Pasdar and pro-regime torturer while posted in Turkey) comes immediately to mind. Suffering torture after falling out with the regime and more than willing to forego a visit and insult the White House to maintain his clandestine contract with the Mullahs to work on their behalf and infiltrate the West in return for his life being spared. Former "prisoner" Fakhravar, who has been taken into the embrace of the State Department and apparently provided with substantial funds - claims he was a student during the 18th Tir student uprising in Tehran. Real students state he was part of the suppression units of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and was not a student at all. Since they suffered at his hands they should know. To set up and operate the "anti"-Islamic regime operation envisaged by the StateDept., he has been joined by Akbar Mohammadi, whose brother was killed in prison not so long ago. Fakhravar vouched for Mohammadi, whose first words out of his mouth were to "out" Fakhravar as a Pasdar and not a student, only to quickly shut up when told of the amounts of money that were being provided. For pretending to go against the Mullahs. Some outstandingly loud ladies, who rant against the Islamic regime also rant against some of those who actively attack the Mullahs. And try to suppress such activites because they have close family members back home in danger of being thrown back into prison. Or are being paid. The list goes on and on, including ex-IRGC employees who could not get into the USA and now operate out of Canada to establish pro-USA credentials in the Media and Internet and sow disinformation in the 80/20 or 90/10 ratio mentioned above]. Others are Islamist revolutionaries that have been set up to look like dissidents - often having been arrested and imprisoned, but released for “medical reasons”. The clue to detecting the fake “dissident” is to read carefully what he/she writes, and to ask why this vocal “dissident” was released from prison when other real dissidents have not been released, indeed have been grievously tortured and executed. Other agents have been placed in this country for over twenty-five years to slowly go through the system and rise to positions of academic prominence due to their knowledge of Farsi and Shia Islam or Islamist fundamentalism. (University professors, doctors and similarly placed clandestine operatives can be found all over the USA - and in many parts of Europe). One of the usual tactics of VEVAK is to co-opt Academia to its purposes. Using various forms of bribery, academics are bought to defend the Islamic Republic or slander its enemies. Another method is to assign bright students to train for academic posts as specialists in Iranian or Middle East affairs. Once established, such individuals are often consulted by our government as it tries to get a better idea of how it should deal with Iran. (Names such as Nasr and Parsi, who are frequently propounding about Iran on TV and Radio or Talk shows, come to mind here). These academics then are in a position to skew the information, suggesting the utility of extended dialogue and negotiation, or the danger and futility of confronting a strong Iran or its proxies such as Hizballah (Hezbollah). These academics serve to shield the regime from an aggressive American or Western policy, and thereby buy more time for the regime to attain its goals, especially in regards to its nuclear weaponry and missile programs. MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence & Security) likes to use the media, especially electronic media, to its advantage. One of VEVAK's favorite tricks is setting up web sites that look like they are opposition sites but which are actually controlled by the regime. These sites often will be multilingual, including Farsi, German, Arabic, French and English. Some are crafted carefully and are very subtle in how they skew their information (e.g., Iran-Interlink, set up and run by Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife Ann Singleton from Leeds, England); others are less subtle, simply providing the regime's point of view on facts and events in the news (e.g., mujahedeen.com. hyperlink removed by me as this is a poisoned website. Do NOT visit.) This latter group is aimed at the more gullible in our open society and unfortunately such a market exists. However, if one begins to do one's homework, asking careful questions, the material on these fake sites generally does not add up. Let's examine a few examples of VEVAK's work in the United States. In late October, 2005, VEVAK sent three of its agents to Washington to stage a press event in which the principal Iranian resistance movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), was to be slandered. Note similarity to mujahedeen sites mentioned above. Veteran VEVAK agent Karim Haqi flew from Amsterdam to Canada where he was joined by VEVAK's Ottawa agents Amir-Hossein Kord Rostami and Mahin (Parvin-Mahrokh) Haji, and the three flew from Toronto to Washington. (This is the standard infiltration channel for Islamic regime operatives since they can claim and find "asylum" quite easily in Canada. And liberal Amsterdam, though gradually changing, is a major European launching point for Mullah operatives). Fortunately the resistance had been tracking these three, informed the FBI of their presence in Washington, and when the three tried to hold a press conference, the resistance had people assigned to ask pointed questions of them so that they ended the interview prematurely and fled back to Canada. Abolghasem Bayyenet is a member of the Iranian government. He serves as a trade expert for the Ministry of Commerce. But his background of study and service in the Foreign Ministry indicates that Bayyenet is more than just an economist or a suave and savvy businessman. In an article published in Global Politician on April 23, 2006, entitled “Is Regime Change Possible in Iran?”, Bayyenet leads his audience to think that he is a neutral observer, concerned lest the United States make an error in its assessment of Iran similar to the errors of intelligence and judgment that led to our 2003 invasion of Iraq, with its less than successful outcome. However, his carefully crafted bottom line is that the people of Iran are not going to support regime change and that hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actually has achieved greater popularity than his predecessors because of his concern for the problems of the poor and his fight for economic and social justice. To the naive, Bayyenet makes Ahmadinejad sound positively saintly. You can include some very significant, important and major websites in the USA among the naive. One England based ardently Royalist/Monarchist website posts a highlighted link to a disguised former Pasdar employee, now in Canada, who has wrapped himself in a royalist cloak as part of his disinformation campaign to appear a devotee of the royals and thus gain their support and to repeatedly trumpet his support for President Bush to make himself a darling of the USA. While irrefutable evidence shows he is a plant, including photoshop photos trying to establish his father as an officer, naivete rules the day and allows him to operate. Conveniently overlooked is the occurrence of over four thousand acts of protest, strikes, anti-regime rallies, riots, and even political assassinations by the people of Iran against the government in the year since Ahmadinejad assumed office. A recent strategy by the Mullah operatives, to appear to attack the Islamic regime but not to do so, is to attack them as Arabs in Iran and to claim that the Mullahs are "Arabs" and not representative of the Iranian people. Since everyone inside Iran knows that the clerics - with a handful of significant exceptions - are Iranians and not Arabs, this slanted attack can later provide "deniability". Also, since most of the Basiji "suppresion divisions and squads" are in fact Arab mercenaries and most often speak little or no Persian, the populace can aslo be misled and have their hate of the Mullahs redirected). So too, the following facts are ignored: the sizeable flight of capital, the increase in unemployment, and the rising two-figure rate of inflation, all within this last year. Bayyenet is a regime apologist, and when one is familiar with the facts, his arguments ring very hollow. However, his English skills are excellent, and so the naive might be beguiled by his commentary. Mohsen Sazegara is VEVAK's “reformed revolutionary”. A student supporter of Khomeini before the 1979 revolution, Sazegara joined the “imam” on his return from exile and served in the government for a decade before supposedly growing disillusioned. He formed several reformist newspapers but ran afoul of the hardliners in 2003 and was arrested and imprisoned by VEVAK. Following “hunger strikes”, Sazegara was released for health reasons and permitted to seek treatment abroad. Although critical of the government and particularly of Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Sazegara is yet more critical of opposition groups, leaving the impression that he favors internal regime change but sees no one to lead such a movement for the foreseeable future. His bottom line: no one is capable of doing what needs to be done, so we must bide our time. Very slick, but his shadow shows his likely remaining ties to the MOIS. Interesting how UN Secretary General Kofi Anan echoes the same disinformation and how IAEA former military General from North Africa, El-Baradei helps run interference for teh Mullahs. Possibly because his wife is the daughter of an Islamic Iranian Ayatollah?

CHINA TO DUMP ONE TRILLION DOLLARS IN US RESERVES

***BREAKING NEWS *** THE SKY MAY BE FALLING! AND IT'S NOT IRAN, except as a minor participant. The Hal Turner Source of this material is not always accurate so please read as uncorroborated. CHINA TO DUMP ONE TRILLION IN U.S. RESERVES! Tells visiting Bush administration officials they will not sit back and lose their shirts as U.S. Dollar collapses; they are getting out fast and large! BEIJING, CHINA -- Sources with a U.S. Delegation in Beijing have told The Hal Turner Show the Chinese government has informed visiting Bush Administration officials they intend to dump One TRILLION U.S. Dollars from China's Currency Reserves and convert those funds into Euros, gold and silver! China was allegedly asked to withhold the announcement until Bullion Markets closed for the weekend to prevent an instant spike in gold and silver prices. This delay will give the world the weekend to consider appropriate actions rather than have a knee-jerk reaction which could see the U.S. Dollar totally collapse in value Monday. According to this Senior source, China told the U.S. delegation they no longer have faith in U.S. Currency for several reasons: 1) The Federal Reserve Bank ceased publishing "M3" data in March, making it nearly impossible for anyone to know how much cash is being printed. China said this act made it impossible to tell how much a Dollar is worth. 2) The U.S. Dollar has lost upwards of thirty percent (30%) of its value against other foreign currencies in the recent past, meaning China has lost almost $300 Billion simply by holding U.S. Dollars in its reserves. 3) The U.S. has no plans whatsoever to reduce deficit spending or ability pay down any of its existing debt without printing money to pay it off. For these reasons China has decided to implement an aggressive sell-off of U.S. Dollars before the rest of the world does so. China reportedly told the US delegation; "we are the largest holder of U.S. Currency and if the rest of the world unloads theirs before we unload ours, we will lose our shirts." Early this week, in an unusual move, the Bush administration sent virtually the entire economic "A-team" to visit China for a "strategic economic dialogue" in Beijing Dec. 14 and 15. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke lead the delegation, along with five other cabinet-level officials, including Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez. Also in the delegation was Labor Secretary Elaine Chao, Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, Energy Secretary Sam Bodman, and U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab. The Bush administration wanted to get China's cooperation in preventing a dollar collapse. The Hal Turner Show has been told the effort failed. According to the source, Fed Chairman Bernanke left the meeting "pale and in a cold sweat" as the implications of China's decision seemed to sink in. The implications are enormous: The U.S. Dollar is likely to collapse in value against all other major currencies as early as Monday, December 18. This would cause a worldwide sell-off of dollars, create almost immediate "hyper-inflation" in the US and also impact world markets at a level "worse than the Great Depression of 1929." Arabs to the rescue? In a strange twist of fate, Arabs and OPEC may come to the rescue of the U.S.! Senior officials in OPEC made clear that they too would be severely harmed if the U.S. Dollar collapsed, and hinted they "would not be inclined to sell oil to any particular nation that intentionally caused such a collapse." This was a thinly veiled threat to China, which depends heavily on OPEC oil for its rapidly developing energy needs.The OPEC officials even went so far as to say "Since China lacks the ability to project their military power, OPEC nations need not worry about any Chinese military response to an oil cut-off." Such brutally candid remarks will not sit well with China; and signal ominous things for the U.S. Arabs and OPEC will want something in return for saving the U.S. from economic collapse and it is already widely speculated what they want will be a complete change in U.S. backing of Israel in the Middle East. If such demands are made by the oil-rich Arabs, the U.S. would be left with little choice but to virtually abandon the jewish state to preserve itself. UPDATE 10:18 PM: The Washington Post confirms. . . ."U.S., China Clash On Currency" Click Here UPDATE 12:07 AM EST, Saturday, December 16, 2006: Additional sources, one in the U.S. Commerce Department and another in the US Treasury have confirmed the initial report above and referred me to another, Third, source in the Pentagon. Both the Commerce and Treasury Sources report that while China will not be able to simply trade their Dollars for other paper currencies, they will spend their U.S. Cash on commodities such as gold, silver and Rhodoium as well as military hardware; ships and planes, placing large orders and paying for those orders with the one point one trillion in cash dollars they possess. Extreme Military Concern In speaking with the contact at the Pentagon, I am able to now report the Pentagon views this currency-killing as a cunning military aspect to Chinese plans: The Pentagon says that while China has a 2 Million man army, they lack the logistics and heavy lift capability to move that army and supply it. They can, however, get that military to South Korea and to Japan. The Chinese see that the U.S. Military is over-stretched and almost exhausted by its globe trotting Commander-In-Chief. They feel that by intentionally destabilizing the dollar, the U.S. economy will fail, putting tens of millions of Americans on the unemployment line and putting unbearable pressure on the US Government. Then, with the U.S. economy in shambles and its manufacturing base eroded by a steady stream of manufacturing plants moving out of the US., the American government will be too occupied with troubles at home to do much internationally. America will be in no position to challenge China, allowing the Chinese to act militarily elsewhere in the world. Further, if the U.S. attempted to intervene against any Chinese military action, the only plant in the world which can manufacture the specialized gyros needed for U.S. Cruise Missile guidance systems, is now located in. . . . .China. China could prevent that plant from shipping to the U.S., and once our arsenal of cruise missiles was depleted, it would take a long time to re-tool a plant to make more gyros and resupply cruise missiles for battle. The Chinese feel they could accomplish certain military goals before the U.S. could re-tool.They are also confident the U.S. will never "go nuclear" as long as the U.S. itself is not attacked. The Pentagon source went so far as to say "Even if China was to lose the entire one trillion in cash to a collapse of the Dollar as a currency, they will have succeeded in taking the U.S. off the world stage as any type of effective military or economic power -- without firing a shot!" A 'classic' Sun Tzu paradigm of victory - the art of fighting, without fighting.The crippling of the US is a highly desirable military benefit for China at a relatively cheap price since it will leave their human capital and infrastructure assets in place; assets they know they would lose if a hot war erupted with the U.S. UPDATE 10:31 AM EST Saturday, December 16, 2006 Washington Post:CONGRESS THREATENS TO DECLARE CHINA "CURRENCY MANIPULATOR" Impose severe sanctions over intent to sell-off One Trillion in U.S. Dollar cash reserves. Click Here MEANWHILE Iran seeks to replace dollar with euro by Hiedeh Farmani Mon Dec 18, 6:45 AM ET TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran has announced it would replace the dollar with the euro in foreign transactions and state-held foreign assets, in an apparent response to mounting US pressure on its banking system. "The government has ordered the central bank to replace the dollar with the euro to limit the problems of the executive organs in commercial transactions," government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham told reporters Monday. "We will also employ this change for Iranian assets (in dollars) held abroad." Amid US allegations that Tehran funds militant groups and is seeking a nuclear weapon, reports have suggested the US treasury has put major pressure on European banking giants to halt transactions involving Iranian clients. Bankers in Iran have complained in recent weeks that it was becoming increasingly difficult to receive Iranian-held money denominated in dollars from European bank accounts. They said that this was because of US pressure on European banking giants not to allow dollar-denominated funds to be sent into, or out of, the Islamic republic. Elham implied the move would apply to oil revenues from the world's number four crude producer, although it would be difficult for Iran to force oil buyers to pay for all of its crude oil in euros. "Foreign income sources and oil revenues will be calculated in euros and we will receive them in euros in order to put an end to our dependence on the dollar," Elham said. In reality, Iran could still receive payment for oil in dollars and then convert it into euros for the state budget. The move comes amid mounting pressure from the United States for the UN Security Council to agree sanctions against Iran over its controversial nuclear program. Elham added that Iran's budget would in future be calculated in euros. "Until now the budget has been calculated according to revenues in dollars, but this calculation will now change," he said. Economy Minister Davoud Danesh Jafari had already said in November that Iran would carry out transactions with currencies other than the dollar and its use of the greenback would drop to a minimum level. Morteza Tamadon, a member of the government's budget and planning commission, said the government was looking to reduce its dependence on the dollar due to the greenback's recent slump as well as because of US pressure. "Iran wants to reduce this vulnerability," he said, adding that the most reasonable option for the government would be to use a basket mixing both currencies. "This is a political manoeuvre as a reaction to the US ban on dollar transactions with Iran," said leading economist Mohammad Reza Behzadian. However he cast doubt on whether Iran would ever be able to demand that all foreign exchange payments for its oil be made in euros. "Iran has said that 60 percent of oil sales are already being carried out in dollars. I suppose the government would keep the remaining amount in dollars because it has to. "The exchange of petrodollars into euros would be very costly for Iran, inflicting high money loss during the procedure. The dollar is very much preferred by foreign sellers." "It's mainly a political move," Investec analyst Bruce Evers told AFP in London. "But also they may feel, possibly rightly so, that the euro is a stronger currency, and that with the dollar as weak as it is they're losing out and it could help them recoup some of the lost revenues." At the Singapore G7 summit of the world's most industrialised nations in September, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson called for a tough stance from the world's financial leaders against Tehran. He said the United States had evidence that major banks had become inadvertently implicated in terrorist financing, adding that US authorities were therefore engaged in an "educational" campaign. The United States broke off relations with Iran after the 1979 storming of the US embassy in Tehran by student radicals, and ties have remained frozen ever since.

BUYING NEW TV? FACTS TO KNOW

Here's information given to someone, who wants to buy a new TV but does not have the knowledge to select well. In the coming week I shall try to post the specifications for the follow up for the most current "Dream Laptop" which supercedes the one I posted last time

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Hi! I hope you can help me out. My trusty, 12-year-old, 36-inch tube TV finally went kaput, and I'm now in the market for a flat-panel TV. I've been out of the TV technology loop for a quite some time now, and I'm absolutely lost. How do I know which type to get? I see a lot of words and acronyms thrown around, and none of them mean anything to me—for example LCOS, LCD, DLP, and of course plasma. And what does it mean when someone is talking about 720p, 1080i, and 1080p? What the difference between HD ready, HDTV, and HD compatible? I didn't have to consider any of these things 12 years ago as my choice back then was either a tube or rear-projection TV and that was it! Please help an old fellow out will you? Thanks! Submitted by: Jeremiah L. of Nashville, Tennessee *********************************************************************** Answer: Jeremiah, pieces of this have been touched on in previous questions of the week, but let’s try to summarize it and update it (things have changed, just in the past few months). Buying an HDTV can be incredibly difficult and complex because there are so many considerations. Display format (nature of the image): The numbers 720p, 1080i and 1080p refer to two different characteristics of the displayed image, it’s resolution (number of dots comprising the picture) and whether it is interlaced or progressive. The HDTV resolutions are 1280 x 720 (720i or 720p) and 1920 x 1080 (1080i or 1080p). Other things being equal, higher resolutions are better. The letter p or i after the number indicates the scan format. A progressive display transmits the entire image every frame. An interlaced display transmits the frame in two fields sent one after the other, the first containing the odd-numbered rows of pixels, the second field containing the even rows. Progressive is better than interlaced. There are some lower resolutions (below 720) which fall into the “EDTV category (not really HDTV) and which should probably be avoided at this point. Note that the HDTV standard requires all sets to display all resolutions, but fact that you can watch a 1080p resolution image on a 720p set does not mean that you get the same quality that you would get on a 1080p set; you don’t. Display technology (how the image is formed): This refers to how the image is created, rather than its format. There are a lot of technologies and it can be hard to keep the technologies and their pros and cons straight. Here’s a list, followed by a brief description: Direct view displays:-Direct view LCD-Direct view PlasmaProjection displays:-CRT-LCD-LCoS-DLPIn Direct view displays, you are looking directly at the image as it is formed; the “screen” is the actual image formation device. In projection displays, the actual image is formed in a small imaging device (often only an inch or so in size) and then projected onto a 40” to 70” screen for viewing. Except for CRT projectors, which are typically 5” to 7” in size, all of the other formats are sometimes also called “microprojection displays” because the actual image as formed prior to projection is so small. There are also “front projectors”, which look and work like an old style slide projector and screen, and “rear projectors” where the entire projection assembly and screen are all built into the cabinet. Here is a capsule summary of each type: Direct view LCD: Essentially a very large laptop computer lid. Thin and flat. By far the most common and probably best display at sizes under about 42”. Can be made at any of the common resolutions. Although available at sizes up into the mid 50-inches (and still larger ones will become available in the future), these become VERY expensive at sizes above about 42”, especially if the panel is also high resolution (e.g. 1080). Contrast ratio (ability to produce truly black blacks) and response times (freedom from ghosting and smearing in fast moving action sequences) may be image quality issues in some displays. Won’t “burn in” and has nearly unlimited life (inexpensive backlight lamp replacement may be required after 5 to 10 years). Direct view Plasma: Another thin and flat display type, but very different from LCD. Better contrast ratio and response time than LCD. Really comes into its own at sizes of 46” and above, where its currently less expensive than LCD (but LCD will “catch up” for cost in the mid 50-inch size range in another year or so). Subject to “burn in” from static images, and has a limited albeit long life (by most estimates, about 60,000 hours in current production sets). Uses relatively a lot of power and many models have cooling fans (potential noise issue). Generally, plasma panels with a 1020 resolution don’t exist (one or two large 1080p plasma sets do exist, and more will appear next year, but they are out of the price range of most consumers). [micro]projection displays:-CRT: Very high brightness old-style “picture tubes” projected onto a screen. In my opinion, any set using this technology should be rejected out-of-hand. While this is a relatively inexpensive technology (possibly under $1,000 for a 50-inch screen), no matter what the stated resolution, due to focus and convergence issues, these sets just do not deliver the image quality of any of the other technologies being discussed. All of the following 3 technologies (LCD, LCoS and DLP) currently use a high intensity lamp as a light source. These lamps are quite expensive ($200 typically, but a few are $500 to $600) and they need to be replaced periodically. Although the manufacturers all quote lamp life as 5,000 to 8,000 hours, there are LOTS of reports on the web of premature lamp failures (often in under a year, at 600 to 1,200 hours of use), and in some instances it’s pretty clear that there are systemic problems with some models of lamps and sets using those lamps. All of the set makers have been responsive to these issues while the sets were still in warranty, but once the warranty expires, you are pretty much on your own. Note that many extended warranties, even if for 3, 4 or 5 years, only provide ONE lamp replacement under the extended warranty, and then you are on your own with regard to lamp replacement, but this is only a general comment and is not by any means universally the case. If you are buying an extended warranty, you need to ask about this. Alternative to the use of these lamps are being developed, but for now, with one exception, it’s a characteristic of all microprojection display systems. Samsung actually sells a set with an LED light source instead of these high intensity lamps, but it’s currently expensive (about $4,000). Development work is underway on laser light sources as well, but these are not currently available in any shipping products. DLP: The light is reflected off of one single Texas Instruments DMD device, which forms the image. Since there is only one device, red, blue and green are presented in succession by using a spinning color wheel inside the set (except for the previously mentioned Samsung set with an LED light source, which works by flashing different colored LEDs). A small number of people can’t watch this type of set without difficulty, because the “eye-brain physiology” that is supposed to result in proper perception of a full color image from this sequential technology isn’t perceived the same way by everyone. LCD: The light is projected through three LCD microdisplays and onto the screen. There has been concern raised that the high intensity light will eventually damage color filters, resulting in deterioration of the colors over time. Not subject to “color wheel effect”. LCoS: The light is reflected off of 3 LCD microdisplays and onto the screen. The technology has some similarities to LCD and uses LCD elements, but like DLP it’s reflective rather than transmissive. Not subject to the “color wheel effect”. With the exceptions of specific characteristics noted, all of these technologies can produce excellent images, which is not to say that all sets using them will. Rather, differences in the design of specific TV set models are more significant than the technology used. Consequently, if you are considering a microprojection set of any type, you have to evaluate the set on it’s own characteristics and not solely on the technology used. What can be said definitively is that if you can ignore the lamp issue (and perhaps even if you can’t), these sets have higher “bang for the buck” in 52-inch and larger screen sizes than either LCD or plasma direct view sets. The cost of a set with a picture size of mid-50-inches to as much as 72” may be as much as thousands less (half or less) what a plasma or LCD direct view set of that size would run, with a 720p or 1080p picture that is equal or better in most regards. But these sets use more power, and they are larger .... these are not thin sets, and they have to stand on a table or stand, they cannot be hung on a wall. Now let’s talk about some TV receiver characteristics unrelated to the actual picture. There are three different transmission systems that you would ideally like to be able to receive:-NTSC-ATSC-QAM (preferably with “cable card” capability) NTSC is our standard “old” TV system, approved by the FCC in March of 1941 (before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor) and in use to this day. All TV sets can receive this. Note, however, that some displays that you may look at are not TV sets, they are only monitors (they need an external tuner or other signal source). ATSC is the system used to transmit digital TV over the air (HDTV is a subset of the broader category of “digital TV”, although the two terms are often used interchangeably). This is replacing NTSC, and over the air NTSC is currently schedule to “die” in February of 2009. QAM is the system used by most cable systems to transmit digital TV over cable systems. If you have a QAM tuner, you may be able to receive unscrambled digital TV channels without a cable box. If you have QAM and a cable card slot, and if you get a cable card for the slot (typically from your cable company), you may be able to receive even scrambled, premium content without a cable box. A set that is “HD ready” has only an NTSC tuner, but can view HDTV material if it is provided as a video signal from another component (a separate tuner, or a cable box, for example). Note that for legal purposes, any set with the ability to display a 1280x720 or higher resolution picture is considered to be an “HDTV” display. While such a set may show a 1020p or 1020i broadcast, however, it won’t do so at full quality unless it is a 1920x1080 device. “HD compatible” generally means “HD ready” plus having an HDMI interface socket, which brings us to the next matter: Signal Input connections: Since you will be watching not only over-the-air transmissions but also program material from cable systems, VCRs, Disc Players and perhaps computers, you need a variety of signal inputs to accept and allow connection of picture sources to the TV set. Ideally, you will have almost all of the following types of connections available (and, ideally, two or more of most of them): -Composite Video-S-Video-Component Video-Computer analog VGA-DVI-HDMI Notes:-DVI and HDMI are electrically identical as far as the electrical signals carrying video is concerned; it’s possible to convert either to the other. However, there are signal compatibility issues which may keep any source (DVI or HDMI) from working with any TV set. Problems are more common with a DVI source than with an HDMI source, but they sometimes occur even with an HDMI-to-HDMI connection. -Most TVs don’t have a 15-pin analog VGA computer connection, but quite a few do. This is obviously more important to some people that to others. -Just because you have the electrical connection doesn’t mean a given combination of TV and signal source will always work. There are 18 different digital TV broadcast formats approved for transmission in the US by the FCC. When you add non-broadcast sources and computers, the number of different possible signal types and formats gets even higher. Unfortunately, everything doesn’t work with everything in every format. But some sets are a lot more compatible than others. Unfortunately, you almost need to consult either detailed specification documents and/or user groups on the internet to be able to evaluate what really works with what. Ok, enough (too much?) for the technical details. Here are some buying guidelines: -If you are looking at anything up to about 42 inches, then you are probably going to be getting a direct view LCD set -If you want a thin, flat “mount on wall” set from 42 to 52 inches, then you have a choice of LCD or Plasma -If you want a thin, flat “mount on wall” set of more than 52 inches, Plasma is currently your only choice -At 50 inches and above, or if you want a 1920x1080 display, a microprojection display technology will be a LOT less expensive than LCD; 1080 plasma has only existed for a couple of months, only a couple of models currently exist and it’s outrageously expensive. I know that this has been a long response. I hope that it was helpful. The question, reasonable enough, has a surprisingly long and complex answer, which is why so many people buying new TV sets are so confused. Submitted by: Barry W. of North Canton, Ohio